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Introduction and Theses
onhuman animals are vulnerable to
all manner of plights and plundering at the hands both of nature
and of human institutions and
practices, from predation, natural disaster, and
disease to trapping, veal-calf crating, and electric
shock. In this paper we explore a certain class of
such plights and plundering and those features
of animals that leave them peculiarly vulnerable
to them. In the spirit of Heidegger's distinction
between the ontic and ontological,l we will call
these an animal's "ontological vulnerability."
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The term will be clarified further through the
presentation. For the moment, an example from
my own field of phenomenological psychology
provides an initial handle. In his early work on
schizophrenic and schizoid ways of being, R.D.
Laing (1965) describes a type of person who lives
as if he or she is not a self but is a thing. He or
she is not just an inadequate or a bad self, but is a
no-self. Such a being does not live as a center of
autonomous action. As distinguished from the
loss of a particular self, this loss implies an ontological vulnerability in that there is, at least apparently, a loss of the structure that makes it possible
for a person to become any particular self.2
We will describe two types of such vulnerability
in nonhuman animals. The first is a vulnerability
to the loss of individuality. Again, the threatened
loss here is not merely the failure to achieve a
particular style or feature, or personal or social
history that might constitute an animal as an
individual, but is the ontological threat of loss of
the possibility of being an individual. We will link
this death of the individual to a humanistic
concept which categorically excludes nonhuman
animals from the status of individual. Finally, we
will suggest that certain features of animals, such
as limitations in reflective and linguistic capacities, invite this reductive social construction of
animality.
The second type of ontological vulnerability is
a loss of species identification wherein an animal
becomes what we will call a "generic animal" or
an organism. This reduction is exemplified
through an account of laboratory research using
animals. It will argued that this vulnerability is
made possible through a radical dependence in
the case of nonhuman animals on their species
specific habitat, by contrast to the human possibility of a relative transformation, through symbolism, of his or her setting. By contrast to the
first type, we will show that this second reduction,
more clearly, actually occurs. Beyond the social
construction of the generic animal, we actually
create such beings.
In that my approach here is that of a phenomenologically orien ted social scien tist, for
both types I will first describe certain contemporary ways of living toward nonhuman animals
which both build on and help sustain the two
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ontological reductions. This approach is akin to
but distinguishable from an analysis using label
and social role assignmen t (Herzog, 1988). It is
more directly a derivative of the social phenomenological approach of Schutz in which
reality is described as a social construction consisting of networks of typifIcations (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966). However, in addition to
describing relevant ways of living toward a particular object, in regard to the second reduction,
I will also attempt a more direct explication of
that object's, an animal's, way of being, again
employing phenomenological method. s
The term "death of the animal" is an allusion
to Barthes' "death of the author" (1977). In that
seminal postmodernist essay, Barthes crystallizes
the sense in which certain intellectual trends are
changing the way we live toward authorship. For
example, in this attitude a text is less the creative
fulfillment of an individual artistic intention than
it is a conduit for prevalent images and ideas in
various language communities. The author has
died in the sense that we, including the author,
no longer live toward what he or she is doing in
"creating" a text as authorship, in the traditional
meaning of autonomous creative agent. By
"death of the animal" I refer both to our living
toward animals as a reduced kind of being and to
practices that actually effect an ontological
reduction in animals.
1. Deindividuation: An Animal As Species
Although subtle and complex in their origins
and maintenance, the ways we refuse to live
toward an animal as an individual are familiar
and pervasive. When I argue with a deer hunter
or my neighbor who now permits trapping his
land where my dog used to run, or the local
game warden, we usually talk past each other. We
do so not simply because we disagree (I can talk
to Republicans), but because I tend to refer to
that deer as that individual, the one the hunter
wounded and then, after tracing the buck in the
field across the way, killed; while he or she refers
to "the deer," as for example, the status of the
deer species in Maine this fall following a particularly mild winter and early spring. "The deer"
refers to a species as a reified entity rather than
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opment during the years around World War II
(Mason & Singer, 1980). There the tension is
between the two poles of our second ontological
reduction - from species to generic animal.
"Beef," "pork," and "chicken" are vestiges of
species-specific consideration. "Meat" is already a
reference to the generic animal. (Of course, a
further reduction, not dealt with in this paper, is
from generic animal to commodity, from meat to
price of meat, from animal to stock.)
But even the companion animal, among
whom is "man's best friend," is vulnerable to
deindividuation. Our consciousness of breed
often supplants our awareness of even our own
pet's individuality. Temperament, peculiarities,
personality are lived toward as species-specific
rather than as idiosyncratic, as a feature of this
individual. When my dog dies, friends suggest
that I go out and replace him - you'll feel
better, they say with best intentions. That I lived
with that dog for eight years, that I saw him
through the death of his adoptive mother and
the trapping inciden t and that he saw me
through comparable events in my life is of no
count. Their reference is not to that particular,
historical intimate relation, to the world we had
together; rather, implicitly they refer to black
labs and how they make gentle companions. This
attitude allows the practice of abandonment in
shelters and "sacrifice" in labs of our nonhuman
animal companions.
A version of a utilitarian ethic, what Singer
calls the total view (1979, p. 100) embodies a
derivative form of deindividuation. In this view, a
being is merely a receptacle of something
valuable. That valuable something can be as
easily contained in another receptacle. Hence,
the replacement of one with another has no
ethical cost. In more phenomenological terms,
Laing and Cooper, explicating Sartre, describe a
relation of seriality in which one individual lives
toward a second in a relation of externality and
interchangeability (1971). In their example (pp.
121-2), the person in front of me when I am
waiting for a bus is reduced to a member of a collectivity. Being only one of so many in line, he or
she is identical with and replaceable by any other
member of the group. This serial identity and
consequent replace ability is in turn made pos-

as an aggregate of individual deer. General academic consensus notwithstanding (Munson,
1971), for him or her a species is not an
abstraction. Correlatively, that deer he or she just
killed is not (or was not) a concretely present
individual, for anyone deer is largely lived
toward as a part of that reification, "the deer."
Our difference is not just talk. We live toward
and act in regard to that deer accordingly. The
distinction is a fundamental one at the level of
the structure of our respective experiences. In
phenomenological terms, Husserl makes a strong
distinction between an act in which we mean an
object as an individual and one in which our
object is an instance of some specific feature (in
Farber, p. 246). In the former case, we "simply
mean the appearing thing itself' (that deer right
there), while in the latter we refer to some specific feature or features of that deer, some idea or
content of deerness. In the latter case, the specific feature is focal (here a feature or features
that identify a particular species), while the individual, that deer there, is backdrop. More radically, the existing and present individual is
forgotten or nonexistent while the abstract and
absent species is all there is.
Ironically, while at least apparently, it is the
hunter who is "being there" with that individual
deer (I once got within fifty yards of a deer),
while it is the hunter who lets that buck live or
suffer and die, who touches him and his lifeblood at the moment of his death, that deer is
not there for him or her. What is there is an
impersonalized, deindividualized but reified
abstraction, as, for example, some feature of the
population of the deer herd in Maine. In the
same move, this reification of the species dissolves the individual deer and invests the
aggregate of, now, non-individuals with a kind of
unified being that allows members of the species
to be killed as if they were so much grass being
mowed. In Heidegger's term, this deer is lived
toward as a "standing reserve," a resource there
waiting for our use (1977).
While readily apparen t in wildlife management practices, deindividuation is not limited
to that context. Down on the factory farm, individual animals are long gone. Factory or
intensive farming began to accelerate in devel-
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coterminous with, rationality. The attempts of
nonhuman animals at communication generally
seem limited to structures that are less sophisticated than those definitive of language, again, at
least by humanistic lights. Neither do animals
assert their individual rights nor, for that maUer,
make any claims. They do not refer to their
grievances for their capacity for self-reference is
very limited.4 Further, their behavior does appear
to be largely intelligible in terms of its typicality
for a given species. Both personal identity and
individuality seem much less prominen t than this
species-specific behavior. Surely, one could apply
the quip, attributed to a now obscure political
figure, "if you've seen one redwood, you've seen
them all," with almost as much conviction to a
gazelle or a sea lion. In all of these features, the
traditional humanistic view of nonhuman found
easy purchase.
Of course, the modernist conception of individuality is under attack from many quarters of what
is loosely referred to as postmodern thought, all
of which agree that individuality, along with "man"
himself, is a social construction, a product, in
Foucault's term, of a particular episteme (1973, p.
xxii.). Postmodern thought brings human being
down from its romanticized humanistic heights.
For example, we have already alluded to the displacement of authorship, from the author as the
seat of unique, creative intentions, to an emphasis
on language and language communities that, as it
were, speak for themselves and in the service of
which individual authors are mere conduits. An
"individual" is derivative of language both in the
sense that individuality itself is a historically
evolving socio-linguistic construction and in that
the provenance of what I way, including the story I
tell to define myself as an individual, is traceable
to a second-hand loaner from the current culture.
Utilizing the metaphor of height so often applied,
(although mistakenly [Midgley, 1978, pp. 158160]), to the traditional human-animal distinction
- if human is a "lower animal" relative to language, then, we humans are now closer, in the
postmodern construction of subject and individuality, to the other lower animals. Language (and
with it rationality) is no longer the critical cleaver
between human and animal precisely because it is
no longer between them, being now conceived as

sible by the fact that each entity is lived toward as
a receptacle of certain features common to the
group. Each entity in the line is only a placetaker as each black lab is only a container of
certain features of that species. So, I can go out
and replace him.
One way to understand how we come to deindividuate nonhuman animals so pervasively and,
typically, so thoughtlessly involves a review of the
history of "individual" as a social construction. As I
have argued more fully elsewhere (Shapiro, in
press, a.), one still dominant social construction of
individuality took nonhuman animals as the cat~
gorical foil. In this construction animals are
defined as the exemplar non-individual in order
to more discretely and exclusively preserve individuality for human animals. A humanistic philosophy defined rationality or reason as that
feature which is both free and freeing. It argued
that free reason is the sine qua non of individuality,
for only an individual is self-determining or
autonomous. Precisely in distinction from
humans, nonhuman animals are instinct and
need-dominated rather than rational. Despite its
etymological origin in spirit or mind (L. animus)
and in quickening or moving autonomously (L.
animare), in this construction "animal" refers to
the instinctoid, the biologically determined, the
nonrational. Given the gulf between nonhuman
and human animals created by this ideology,
humanistic philosophy can then justifY its reinforcement by the epistemology that we can only
know animals through a scientific method in
which reason is applied to objective and distanced
observation of these now strangely "other" creatures. In the correlative political-legal system, only
individuals are granted legal rights. Hence, as
nonindividuals, animals have no rights and no
legal standing. By sanctioning our forgetting the
individuality of nonhuman animals, these philosophies and traditions support our living toward
them as certain reified classifications, as species.
In a general way, certain features of animals
permit this discriminatory "modernist," as we now
call it, conception of the individual. Some animals
are not rational; others are apparently not; none
are by traditional humanistic lights. Certainly,
animals do not appear to be rational to a viewer
for whom language is a prereqUisite for, if not
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In addition to deconstructing modernist claims
as to the truth about human being in general and
individuality in partiCUlar, postmodernism offers
its own more relativistic and self-consciously
reconstructed views of individuality. One such
view emphasizes historical context and embeddedness and, particularly, narrative accounts of a
person's history as the stuff of individuality
(Ricoeur, 1984). "People conceive of themselves
in terms of stories" (Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 107);
individual identity consists in a person's narrative
account or story of his or her life.
At first glance it would appear that animals are
as vulnerable to deindividuation in such a reconstruction of individuality and individual identity
as in the earlier modernist conception, for they
are not historians or story-tellers. However, as I
have argued elsewhere (Shapiro, in press, b.),
history informs the experience of a particular
animal whether or not it can tell that history.
Events in the life of an animal shape and even
constitute him or her. To understand my dog
Sabaka, I need to know his history, how he was
abandoned at the dump as a pup, how he was
"raised" by another dog we adopted at roughly
the same time as Sabaka and how that dog died a
year later. For, clearly, these vents inform
Sabaka's behavior, his personality, and partly constitute his individuality. Sabaka is an individual in
that he is not constituted through and I do not
live toward him as a species-specific behavioral
repertoire or developmental sequence. More
positively, he is an individual in that he is both
subject to and subject of "true historical particulars" (Gould, 1987). I can not replace him, nor,
ethically, can I "sacrifice" him for he is a unique
individual being.

above or as the primary surround or medium
within which human experience can be meaningful.
Several other developments complement
bringing human being down by raising animal
and, in some instances, inanimate being up. Stone
(1974) claims legal standing for trees, although he
has recently retracted or softened his original
claim (Varner, 1987). Following Whitehead,
Hartshorne's process philosophy argues a concept
of individuality so broad as to include plants, and,
at least in the most primitive of several degrees or
forms of individuality, each cell within a plant
(Dombrowski, 1988). Far from premised on an
exclusionary notion of reason, here individuality
is "based on a pattern of interaction" (p.4) and
participation in an event or process. In a stronger
sense of individuality, animals are true individuals
in that they are wholes that both participate in
and experience these events. A final example is, of
course, Regan's philosophy of animal rights which
confers the rights of an individual to nonhuman
animals (at least mammals of more than one year
of age) on the basis of their being "subjects of a
life" (1983).

2. Generic Animality
To recapitulate to this point, in the first part
we argued (1) that we can and do live toward an
animal forgetting his or her individuality, and (2)
that a certain vulnerability in nonhuman animals
allows the social construction which in turn supports that attitude.
In this section we will argue that a second
reduction is possible and indeed prevalent. We
can and do live toward an animal in a way that
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the chickens are, focally, a job to be done. They
are only animals implicitly, occasionally, and,
undoubtedly, reluctantly. As animals they are
lived toward as potential meat or eggs, produce,
or producers of stock for the market.
In the research laboratory, animals are also
caged. In this setting they are primarily lived
toward as objects of study.~ Typically, in both
biomedical and psychological research, the object
of study is a general process rather than a speciesspecific physiology or behavior. The animal is
lived toward as a "preparation" (Devereux, 1967)
where what is being readied is not a rat or cat or
dog but an organic or behavioral process.
Whether through stereotaxic fIxation or anesthetization or restraint in a Pavlovian sling, the
preparation or making ready is an attempt to
eliminate any individual and species identity in
order to disclose for study a general process, a
biological organism, a generic animal.·
The term "generic" has recently become laden
with meanings and we must pause to unpack it.
In the supermarket and in the drug store,
generic brands refer to products that offer the
genuine article with relatively little packaging,
and, in some instances, with minimal adulteration and "refinement." Peanut butter becomes
nothing but peanuts buttered, no longer contaminated by dextrose, partially hydrogenated vegetable oil, salt and corn sweeteners. By contrast,
in the context of literary works, generic refers to
a reduction to a minimal form that delivers a sensationalized, merely titillating derivative without
the genuine article. On the side of the "author,"
a harlequin romance is a produce made and
assembled by a formula. On the side of the
reader, it is ''love'' without a relationship, sensuality without the body, only packaging.
We read these related cultural trends to
express an ambivalence between the modernist
searches for a universal essence and for a transparent self-consciousness. As Lasch has described
(1979), in recent times the latter has degenerated into a narcissism in which the self dissolves and is sought in externally provided
mirrors. An object is generic, then, when its pure
essence is sought or when merely the effect on
self of that essence is sought. In this paper, our
use of the term refers to a possible effect in the

denies it its species identity as well as its individuality. ("It" seems the more appropriate pronoun
as we move from the individual/species to the
species/generic animal interface.) Here,
however, we will argue further that this social
construction and a certain vulnerability in
animal being combine to effect the actual
reduction - an animal is reduced to a generic
being. This reduction is ontological rather than
ontic in that an animal loses not just a particular
species identity but the possibility of being any
species. Since the argument for the actual loss of
species being is more problematic, we will begin
with a description of the social construction of a
generic animal.
We will argue that this second reduction is
more prominent in our practices toward laboratory and factory farm animals, while the first
reduction more often prevails as our attitude
toward wild and companion animals. However,
the following introductory example features a
wild animal for I find the attitude more intuitively compelling and more popularly accessible
in that context.
A lion in a cage is not a lion. Of course, as we
stand at the cage in which this animal is
exhibited, we can imaginatively place it in the
African savannah, lying near a thicket, having
shared its kill with its pride and now licking its
paws and enjoying its repose with a giant yawn.
But even an individual of this most familiar
species, mythologized as the king of beasts, we as
often experience in terms of the stereotypic
behavior of any large mammal permanently
housed in a small cage. The repetitive pacing
and rocking, the lack of interaction with and
interest in conspecifics and surroundings fail to
evoke lion country. When our experience takes
this turn, we are beginning to live toward this
animal as a generic being, as neither a locus of
individual nor of species-specific being.
In the less familiar setting of modern intensive
animal husbandry, this attitude is almost
unavoidable. Consider that a chicken, for
example, shares with three or four other chickens
a cage the floor of which is little larger than this
journal page, and that the structure housing the
cage contains as many as 80,000 chickens (Mason
and Singer, 1980). For the factory farm worker,
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object of such ambivalent and confused questsnamely, the loss of both individual particularity
and species typicality.
Since it is common to all of the three
examples, zoo, factory farm, and laboratory, we
will take "cage" as a metaphor for the reduction
to generic animal. While not a necessary concomitant, we will use "caging an animal" to refer
to a way we can live toward an animal kept in a
radically depleted setting. That divorce from a
fuller, more "enriched," usually more naturalistic setting may be in the service of market
quality, as in intensive farming, or of control, as
in laboratory research. In the latter, experimental control typically is the attempt to eliminate all variability attributable to individual and
species-specific behavior. Through this regulative ideal, this natural scien tific en terprise
believes a general or essential nature can be
revealed.
When we live toward the lion (or chicken or
rat) as a caged animal, we have lost both lion
country and lion behavior, both species-specific
habitat and behavior or habit. What, if anything,
is the comparable loss for the animal? We turn
now to a consideration of the life of an animal
lived toward as generic. Beyond our social constructions of an animal in a cage, we will have to
show that a particular setting is a precondition for
a particular species being. Absent that precondition, we can then assess whether the resultant
generic animal is a destructive trivialization or a
revelation of the universal; and, finally, whether
that reduction is harmful to an animal.
The form of nonhuman animal being is
ambiguous in that it derives from both individuality and species membership. The relative power
of the two determinants underlying both (respectively, although only roughly, individual history
and biological givens) varies in the different
animal life-forms. We are concerned in this
section with the contribution of species mem- .
bership to an animal's being, with the possibility
of the loss of that contribution, and with understanding what is left following that loss.
Analogous to the folk-ways that an anthropologist
locates in a given culture, we will refer to the
behavioral forms peculiar to and typical of a
given species as "species-ways."
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The concept of species must be clarified. For
Aristotle, each kind of animal has a telos, an
unchanging nature that distinguishes it and that
is the "sole determinan t of its form" (Bakan,
1971, p. 341). By contrast, with Darwin telos or
species can change gradually, not for a given
animal but from individual to individual over
time. In contemporary evolutionary theory, there
is also the possibility of relatively dramatic and
discontinuous change in a species or in the emergence of new species (Gould, 1982, pp. 179-186).
In both these versions of evolutionary theory,
although species and species-ways can now come
and go, they do so under nature's auspices.
However, beyond this loosening of the classical
notion of telos in evolutionary theory, with the
advent of behaviorism and genetic engineering
the concept becomes unrecognizable. In the most
radical version of behaviorist theory, there is no
consideration of ways typical of and determined
by species identity. Environmental contingencies
determine animal (and human) behavior. An
animal has no intrinsic nature, species-specific or
otherwise, beyond its "capacity" to be passively
determined by its environment. While the environment can not quite effect flight in mice (they
can be "taught" to leap off a platform), it can
"shape" ping-pong playing and a preference for
pictures of people, in pigeons. At least in accord
with this theory, the radical behaviorist already
lives toward an animal as a generic being. While
radical behaviorism is in decline, methodological
behaviorism is still dominan t and, arguably,
evokes this attitude in the investigator.
With the development of genetic engineering,
both the classical and Darwinian concept of
species are challenged again. With technology
that allows material from different species to be
spliced together, animals are produced which
stretch any notion of the hybridization associated
with selective breeding. The genetic engineer
thinks less in terms of combining discrete
species-ways and more in terms of gene pools
that consist of raw material or raw information.
The genetic code peculiar to a given animal has
no more intrinsic integrity than one filing system
among many. A species is a momentary organization of a certain chunk of information. An
individual animal is reduced to certain genetic
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lion being. That part of animal being that is
attributable to species membership is radically
dependent on natural habitat for more than
merely a surround or medium, it is necessary for
the animal to be that species. The animals of a
particular species dwell there in the sense that
they have their being there. Lyons (1989, personal communication) writes that "the flower is
part of the bee's anatomy." This is true in the
sense that habitat and habit are a unity necessary
for the possibility of that insect-way.
By comparison a human being is its habitat in
a weaker sense. Through reflection he or she can
take up a posture to a given environment and,
thereby, can transform it symbolically to create
with it a world. Unable to construct a world by
taking a reflective posture to selected features of
its environment, a nonhuman animal becomes
itself only through certain features of that
habitat. A nonhuman animal's radical dependence on a species specific habitat is part of its
ontological vulnerability to the reduction to
generic animal. By contrast, through his or her
power of symbolic transformation a human
being in a cage or prison is limited to ontic suffering. He or she remains a being burdened with
the ability to make the meaning of that experience explicit. 7 However, the loss of a lion
deprived of lion country or of a bee without
flowers is ontological as well as ontic.
In another work (Shapiro, in press, b.), I
describe how my dog seeks and establishes possible habitations, places that he appropriates as
his own and which serve as vantage points or
points of view for him. An animal's habitat is his
or her dwelling place not only in the sense of providing a particular home butin the sense of being
the substance of his or her species identification.
A species way or habit requires inhabiting a
certain habitat. Niche is constitutive, not substitutive. The notion that an animal's telos remains
inside, intact and unchanging as long as its biological integrity is maintained is a limited and
convenient abstraction. To "ex-hibit" an animal in
a cage is to take it out of its habitat which is to
lose its species-way which is to reduce it to a
generic animal.
As we indicated we have taken "caging" as a
metaphor for the possibility of the reduction to

information that can be readily otherwise
informed. The form and species-way of an individual animal are reduced to the expression of
certain genetic information - form follows
information. The way of living toward an animal
consistent with the concept of genetic material
or manipulable information is, by our definition
of the term, as generic being.

T

he spider's web
notwithstanding,

human beings are the
consummate cage-makers.
Only we can exhibit an animal.

Here we will locate a concept of species and
species-ways that is mid-way between the
Aristotelian concept of a fixed and intrinsic
nature and these contemporary denials of a
species-specific nature. Ecology directs us
foremost to an ecosystem and to the relations
that comprise that system. In ecology species
refers to a typical morphology and behavior and
its relation to a certain environment. But environment (etymologically from F. virer, to turn; by
extension meaning circuit or surround) does not
capture the constitutive role of that relation in
animal being. An animal is not merely surrounded by, so much as it is a constituent part of
that system. Species-ways are part of what effects
a certain ecosystem. In the other direction, the
effect of ecosystem on species-ways is as constitutive and is better captured by the terms "habit"
and "habitat" (L. habere, to have and hold) than
by the term environment. When we say that the
animal inhabits a certain habitat we mean that a
particular habitat is the necessary locus of being
of a particular species. The dynamic relation
between lion and lion country is constitutive of
Between the species
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a calf, and an obese or hairless or tumerogenic
rat who cannot gnaw or scurry or explore still a
rat, however pathetic?
I suggest that we actually have produced a
generic animal when that animal is chronically
bored. When the relation between environment
and animal is chronically such that the animal
has no interest in its environment, the habitathabit unity that sustains and constitutes a speciesway has been split asunder and the lion or
chicken or rat is no longer.
Wemelsfelder (1984) offers various indices for
determining the presence of boredom in an
animal, such as stereotypic movement, redirected
activity, vacuum behavior, and immobility over
long periods (p. 133). Approaching the present
thesis, she further characterizes boredom as a
state in which an animal "misses the opportunity
to perform its specific behavior" (p. 117), or
"does not have the chance to perform the
behavior which is part of a species-specific range
of behavioral possibilities" (p. 124).
This criterion, the presence or absence of
chronic boredom, offers a solution to the
problem of when or whether an animal selectively bred or genetically engineered to adjust to
being caged is a generic animal. By the way, the
result of such practices is apparently not as
effective as one might think. Mter hundreds of
generations of life in captivity even the albino rat
retains, at least potentially, certain species specific behaviors such as burrowing (Wemelsfelder,
pp. 126-7); and after thousands of years of
domestication the domestic dog retains vestigial
instinctive behaviors associated with its genetic
wild forebears (Fox, 1978). However, to whatever
degree that we can or could genetically engineer
an animal to adjust to being caged, we are
arguing that if the animal is chronically bored it
has been ontologically reduced to a generic
animal. Whether it "misses an opportunity" for
species-specific behavior that is genetically
"present" or whether it no longer has that
genetic potential, if the animal is chronically
bored it is living without a species-way.
When this criterion is fulfilled, "adjusting" an
animal through genetic manipUlation to a radically deprived environment does not produce a
new species-way. If the resultant animal is chroni-

generic animal. Obviously, not all caging of all
animals has that effect. Now we must say when
that reduction actually does occur. We anticipate
several major problems. Is not what a rat does whether in a field, apartment building, or cage
- rat behavior? Is not the wayan animal adjusts
to whatever manipulation of environment to
which it is exposed its typical species-way? If
many species adjust in a similar way or with
similar behavior to radical manipulation or
depletion of setting, is not that still a species-way,
although common across species? If a species is
selectively bred or genetically engineered to
behave in a certain way in a depleted environment, is not that behavior now its speciesway? How can we locate the generic animal in all
of this?
Clearly human intervention produces massive
change in animals on an individual and species
level. Interventions on the species level occur
through manipulation of habitat or genetic constitution. Whether in the service of preserving
endangered species through habitat management or artificial propagation strategies, or of
increasing the popUlation of "game" animals by
habitat manipulation, or of increasing the compatibility of companion animals through selective
breeding, many of these changes involve either
or both external and internal te/os manipulation
without yet producing a generic animal.
Whatever the ecological and social effects and
ethics of our having a sandhill crane raise
whooping crane babies, or our producing deer
in abundance by exterminating their natural
predators, or our breeding less aggressive black
labs or more efficient sheep dogs, their species
integrity is not in question. But consider crating
a veal calf or selectively breeding a mouse so that
it is susceptible to audiogenic seizures. Intuitively,
these are more extreme examples of, respectively, external and internal te/os manipulation.
Perhaps they are extreme in the sense that the
manipUlation is more grossly in the service of
human need rather than extensions of the particular species defining features. What it tastes
like is not directly a part of a cow's species-way,
although it is partly a product of what it eats or is
allowed or forced to eat. Still, is not a calf who is
not allowed to turn around or to see daylight still
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Wemelsfelder characterizes it as a form of distress (p. 137). She speculates that this distress
may be related to helplessness, itself a form of
stress, or to understimulation. However, in
addition to this subjective state, intuitively, the
loss of species-way is itself harmful.
To be clear, our focus here is not the more
typical concern with the harm done through
species extinction induced through human intervention. Arguments proffered to account for the
harm consequent upon the loss of a species-way
through extinction are difficult enough to make.
Often, such ethics are baldly speciesist, locating
the harm exclusively in concern for human
welfare. For example, Wilson describes a conservation ethic (1984, pp. 119-40) in which "each of
the millions of species can be visualized as a book
in a library." The survival of a species provides
greater diversity of genetic material as a resource
for our health through potential innovations in
medicine. It also provides a richer intellectual
nutrient for our "biophilia," the "innate
[human] tendency to focus on life and lifelike
processes" (p. 1). Incidentally, this emphasis on
animals as genetic material for human welfare
and stimulation is close to an apology for
unbridled genetic engineering.
In any case, our concern is with the harm
done to a living individual animal that is bereft of
species-way. Following Kohak (1984), it would be
tempting to argue that an animal's loss of
species-way is harmful in terms of the loss of the
natural. Kohak speaks of the "moral sense of
nature" (p. 70). In addition to the "economy of
nature," the efficient working of an ecosystem,
"the sense of nature includes also a dimension of
value" (p. 70). There is an "integrity, a rightness"
to the presence of the chipmunk peering out at
us from his or her hideaway. An animal can live
in nature in the sense of being sensitive to the
rhythms, light, and spatiality of day and night,
and of the changing seasons. For Kohak, our
contribution to their loss of that sense is a moral
issue for there is a rightness in that natural
presence for them. The battery chicken or laboratory rat who knows only constant light or temperature is harmed by the deprivation of natural
change. By this neo-naturalism, my dog's appreciation of the rhythm of my business day, which is

cally bored, "cage-country" and "cage-animal"
behavior are not a new habitat-habit unity for
there is no dynamic or living relation between
them. Finally, while the stereotyped behavior that
is pathognomic of boredom is common across
species, it is precisely not species behavior both
because it is not distinctive or specific and because
it is not a way of inhabiting, of dynamically living
in and being through a particular habitat. A
chronically bored animal is an ex-hibited animal
which is, then, a generic animal. While neither all
caging nor all genetic engineering results in such,
these are the primary means of producing this
reduction. The spider's web notwithstanding,
human beings are the consummate cage-makers.
Only we can exhibit an animal.
While to this point we have restricted our language to the more neutral "reduction" or "loss,"
we now are in a position to consider whether this
second ontological reduction is harmful. In what
sense is the actual loss of species-way harmful?
Beginning with Singer's seminal work (1975),
the history of the contemporary animal rights
movement can be told in terms of a broadening
of the concept of suffering in animals. This progression is most clear in the context oflaboratory
animal research and attempts at its regulation.
Initially, the literature on housing of lab animals
dealt only with the provision of a minimal
standard of comfort for an animal, while experimentation protocols addressed only the minimization of physical pain where possible within
the demands of the study. However, these
restricted notions of minimal creature comfort
and of physical pain are slowly (and resistantly)
expanding to include the subjective experience
of distress, stress, anxiety and ill-being, and, even
absent felt-experience, to include loss of
function, deprivation of physical, social and intellective stimulation, and death.
I want to argue here that the ontological
reduction to generic animal is a distinct form of
harm that yet further broadens the scope of suffering that we visit on an animal.
Consider a caged animal that through some
combination of selective breeding or genetic
engineering and habitat restriction is chronically
bored. In what sense is this animal being
harmed? Boredom itself is arguably harmful.
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hardly synchronized to the temporality of the
Maine seasons or days, is a harm. Yet he and I
both enjoy that and other socially constructed
rhythms. We live together in a mixed community
(Callicott, 1988) based on shared and, apparently, enjoyable although unnatural rhythms,
boundaries, and other parameters.
Or, following Callicott, we could argue that
producing a generic animal is wrong for it is a
betrayal of an implicit agreement we entered
into with animals of certain species when we first
formed mixed communities with them. The
guinea fowl turned barnyard chicken did not
bargain for this reduction to intensively produced meat and eggs. This is helpful but limited
in that it does not indicate in what way the particular betrayal of reduction to generic animal,
among the many betrayals of domesticated, laboratory and companion animals, is harmful. It
really begs the questions of how and whether the
reduction to generic animal is a particular and
additional form of harm.
Singer argues that an animal has interests and
that he or she is harmed and, therefore, wronged
when deprived of situations or objects through
which those in terests can be realized (1975).
However, in these terms, boredom is not merely
the absence of such objects. In boredom, an
animal has lost the capacity for interest itself, not
merely the opportunity to fulfill interests.
Beyond the distress inherent to it, boredom is
harmful for it deprives an animal, radically, of
interest, of that attitude which directs it to the
environment as a source of stimulation. In the
terms of the present argument, a generic animal
is bereft of species-specific interests (and of individual interests as well) for the habitat-habit unity
which provides the matrix of those interests has
been dissolved. A generic animal is harmed in
that., being bored, it no longer has interests.
Incidentally, the addition of this harm may be
a problem for Singer's account for is not being
an interest-bearer a condition for the application
of the pleasure-pain calculus of utilitarianism?
Perhaps Singer might argue that even the
generic animal was once or is still potentially an
interest-bearer and that, therefore, one can
estimate the loss of pleasure of unfulfilled
interests. However, that claim gets weaker and
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the estimate more difficult to the degree that an
animal is from birth, chronically and permanently a generic animal.
Regan's deontological account appears to work
better here. With Regan, we can say that the production of an animal that lives without having
interests is wrong, for an animal has an inherent
value that inheres in its "having interests." The
deprivation of that capacity is a distinguishable
form of harm.
We conclude that to cage an animal, in the particular meaning we have given that term, is morally
objectionable. Beyond those ontic harms traditionally associated with caging an animal, the production of a generic animal is a distinguishable,
additional, and morally objectionable ontological
form of harm.

1 For Heidegger (1962), ontic refers to the particular condition and experience of an entity, that person, dog, or rock;
while ontological refers to a more general being, a structure
of structures that provide the condition for the possibility of
the particular entity to be what he or she or it is.

2 It is arguable whether this structure is permanently
absent or temporarily blocked.

~ For my general approach to phenomenology, see Shapiro
(1985); for a mixed method developed for the study of nonhuman animals, see Shapiro (in press, b.).

'Arguably, Gallup (1977) has demonstrated a kind of "selfrecognition" in the Great Apes only.
5 However, Arluke (1988) has found that this objectifying
attitude is an ambivalent one.

6 This reduction to a generic being, readied to disclose
itself, is consisten t with Heidegger's description of the
attitude wherein we live toward objects as "ready-to-hand" as there for and only meaningful in terms of our possible use
of that disclosed being (I962. p. 98). However, the present
attitude also requires a decontextualizing and ahistorical
posture not requisite to Heidegger's zuhanden.

7 Scarry (I985) describes the moment of the intense pain
of systematic torture as an "unmaking" of the world.
Systematic torture, then, may be a momentary exception to
this distinction between human and nonhuman animals.
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Munson, R (Ed.) (1971). Man and Nature: PhiwsophicalIssues in
Biowg;y. New York: Delta.
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